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DISTANT VOICES THEN AND NOW: THE IMPACT OF
ISOLATION ON THE COURTROOM NARRATIVES OF
SLAVE SHIP CAPTIVES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS
Tara Patel*
“Individual voices do not necessarily yield the truth, but a mul-
tiplicity of voices from different points of view can serve to
sharpen and improve the story, perhaps moving it toward
truth.”
—Jonathan Bryant,
Dark Places of the Earth:
Voyage of the Slave Ship Antelope
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INTRODUCTION
The truthfulness of a story does not guarantee credibility in status
determination hearings,1 whether for slave ships captives two centuries ago
or for asylum seekers today. Lived experiences, without filtration, are often
messy, tangled, and incoherent to a listener and adjudicator.2 A narrative
gains its credibility only after it “passes a certain threshold of coherence,
fidelity, and conformity to the listener’s perception of the world.”3 The
narratives of slave ship captives emerged with power and persuasiveness
when sought by judges, the public, and counsel.4 The narratives dis-
integrated when captives were isolated and removed from judges, the pub-
lic, and counsel.5 Similarly, in the present day, the narrative truths of
asylum seekers become most persuasive when asylum seekers are given the
opportunity to interact with counsel and the public and remain less per-
suasive when asylum seekers are isolated in detention centers.6
Part I compares the nineteenth century cases of the Antelope7 and the
Amistad8 to identify why they resulted in different outcomes despite having
similar fact patterns. The Antelope concerned the fate of approximately 280
African captives discovered on a slave trade ship upon its interception by a
U.S. revenue cutter.9 Since the slave trade in the United States was illegal
at the time, the captives were transported to Savannah for trial through
which their status—free or slave—would be determined.10 After a lengthy
trial and appeals process in which Spain and Portugal laid claim to the
captives,11 the Supreme Court determined that those captives claimed by a
non-U.S. nation were slaves.12 The Court reasons that however “abhor-
rent” the slave trade was, the United States was obligated to recognize the
rights of other nations to participate in it.13 In comparison, the Amistad
concerned the fate of captives aboard a slave trade ship in which the cap-
tives committed mutiny, attempted to sail to Africa, but were captured by a
1. Jessica Mayo, Court-Mandated Story Time: The Victim Narrative in U.S. Asylum Law, 89
WASH. U.L. REV. 1485, 1496 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part I.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II.
7. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
8. U.S. v. Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841) [hereinafter Amistad]
9. Jenny S. Martinez, International Courts and the Constitution: Reexamining History, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1108 (2011); A revenue cutter is an armed government vessel employed
specially to enforce revenue laws.
10. See id.; see also The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 68.
11. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 124.
12. Id. at 126-27.
13. Id. at 114-15.
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U.S. vessel.14 The Supreme Court ordered them free despite the Spanish
government’s claim that the captives were its property.15 Part I explores
these different outcomes and argues that the absence of Antelope captives’
stories in the litigation process was partly due to the decision to isolate
captives in slavery before their status was determined. In particular, it ar-
gues that this isolation affected the outcome of the Antelope by preventing
captives from sharing their anecdotes and translating them to a format that
would resonate with their legal counsel, the public, and judges. In contrast,
the Amistad captives, while also detained, were situated close to those who
could help them. They were able to transform their truths into a winning
narrative for the court by understanding and leveraging the talents and
expertise of counsel, and the biases of judges and the public.
Part II argues that 200 years later, a similar environment of isolation
suppresses the stories of another group with undetermined legal status: asy-
lum seekers. Although slave ship captives were forced into the country
with chains, while asylum seekers are driven into the country by fear, the
legal status of both groups in their respective time periods was undeter-
mined upon their arrival. Both groups deserved, by legal and moral stan-
dards, the opportunity to present the truth behind their arrival and to
prove their legal status.  Part II argues that the detention of asylum seekers
mirrors the isolation of the Antelope captives by removing detainees from
those most able to help them develop a persuasive narrative truth. Deten-
tion silences important voices, aggravates ineffective representation, dam-
ages public perception, and ultimately harms case outcomes.
I. COMPARING THE ANTELOPE AND THE AMISTAD
A. A Slave Trade History Snapshot
Congress chipped away at the slave trade from 1794 to 1825 (the year
the Antelope was decided),16 yet captives continued to be illegally im-
ported. Congress began regulating the slave trade in 1794,17 increased fines
for violations in the next decades,18 and prohibited the slave trade in 1807
(to take effect in 1808).19 At that point, violations were met with harsher
14. Amistad, 23 U.S. 518, 124 (1841).
15. Id. at 520.
16. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
17. PAUL FINKELMAN, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property? in THE LEGAL UN-
DERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 105, 120 (Jean
Allain ed., 2012) (noting that Congress prohibited the use of U.S. shipyards to be used in trade);
see also Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slavery, and Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1806, 1097 (1993) (noting that in 1974, Congress passed the
first national law to restrict international slave trade by prohibiting the export of slaves from the
United States to other nations).
18. FINKELMAN, supra note 17, at 121.
19. Id.
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punishments, such as extensive jail time and five-digit fines.20 Congress
then passed the 1819 Slave Trade Act, which provided that captives
brought into the United States illegally would come under the authority of
the U.S. president who would then arrange to return the captives to Af-
rica.21 In 1820, Congress passed legislation considering intercontinental
slave trade as piracy, punishable by death.22 In theory, Congress seemed to
be making strides in taking a stand against the international slave trade.23
However, captives continued to be illegally imported into the United
States and sold as slaves24  due to lax federal enforcement and enormous
profits benefitting the U.S. government, Southern states, and individual
Southerners.25 Americans were complicit in this venture, not only as con-
sumers but also as financiers, sailors, and government officers.26
B. Litigation over the Status of Slave Ship Captives
African captives were historically treated as slaves in the United States
before their status was legally determined.27 For example, in 1818, the
U.S. Navy intercepted three American schooners—the Constitution, Ma-
rino, and Louisa—and found 107 captives onboard.28 The resulting cases
were drawn out over approximately six years in an Alabama district
court.29 During that time, the captives were handed to three bondsmen.30
The captives were most likely treated as slaves given that they were sold
20. Id.
21. The Act in Addition, ch. 101, 3 Stat. 532 (1819). This statute contrasts with earlier
statutes that left the “disposition” of illegally imported Africans to individual states. See Holden-
Smith, supra note 17, at 1098; see also W.E.B, DU BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN
SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870, 5-9 (2007) (covering the
individual restrictions states imposed on the slave trade prior to federal laws and enforcement).
22. Holden-Smith, supra note 17, at 1098; Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600 (1820).
23. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 17, at 121-22.
24. Jonathan M. Bryant, “By the law of nature, all men are free”: Francis Scott Key and the case
of the slave ship Antelope, SALON (July 11, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/07/11/%E2%80%
9Cby_the_law_of_nature_all_men_are_free%E2%80%9D_francis_scott_key_and_the_case_of_
the_slave_ship_antelope/.
25. See Holden-Smith, supra note 17, at 1098; see also FINKELMAN, supra note 17, at 122.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., H.R. Res. No. 54, 21st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1831) (illustrating the formal
process for transferring captives to slavery pre-trial by revealing correspondence on what to do
about the capture, by a U.S. vessel, of the Spanish ship Fenix with African captives on board).
28. See 163 S. 10, Expenditures Under the Appropriation for Prohibition of the Slave Trade, 20th
Cong. (1827); see also Slave Ships Marino, Constitution, and Louisa, Hearing on H.R. 231 Before
the Committee on the Suppression of the Slave Trade (1826); see also DU BOIS, supra note 21, at 80.
29. See DU BOIS, supra note 21, at 80.
30. Id.
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and hired31 and that many died from “various causes” before litigation
concluded.32 Eventually, the Supreme Court condemned the vessels but
did not penalize the slave traders.33 In spite of prohibitions against the slave
trade, the captives of the Marino and the Louisa were sold at auction for the
benefit of the State.34 Captives from the Constitution were most likely also
sold, though Congress never officially tracked their outcomes.35 In another
case, the U.S. ship Hornet captured a French slave ship, La Pensee, which
had 240 captives on board.36 As the captives awaited their fate, they were
placed in the hands of a U.S. marshal,37 and also likely treated as slaves
given that only 160 captives survived between their apprehension (Decem-
ber 1821) and the decision to return the captives to France (July 1822).38
Although often overlooked,39 the Antelope was perhaps the most im-
portant and complex case litigating the status of captives.40 Near the end of
June 1820, a U.S. Treasury revenue cutter captured a ship, the Antelope, off
the coast of Florida.41 Over 280 chained captives were on board, most
likely destined for illegal sale in a Southern market.42 The captives’ journey
31. See id. (noting that before the Supreme Court decision, Spanish claimants were paid
$650 per captive and that an individual later petitioned Congress for “reimbursement for the
slaves sold, for their hire, for their natural increase, for expenses incurred, and for damages”).
32. DU BOIS, supra note 21, at 80.
33. Id.
34. Id.; DU BOIS, supra note 21, at 80; See also Dept. of Treasury, Letter from the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Transmitting the Information Required by a Resolution of the House of
Representatives, of the 4th Instant, in Relation to the Rights of Certain Persons to the Cargoes
of the Slave Ships Constitution, Louisa, and Marino, H.R. Doc. No. 19-163, at 35 (1826) (U.S.
Attorney for Mobile, William Crawford, arguing that the “negroes. . .may be condemned to be
sold, and the proceeds of such sale be distributed according to law.”).
35. See DU BOIS, supra note 21, at 80 (noting that although the case of the Constitution
faded “in a very thick cloud of official mist” and that information on the final disposition of the
slaves were never printed, an individual later stepped forward and claimed reimbursement for
“the slaves sold, for their hire, for their natural increase, for expenses incurred, and for
damages.”).
36. Cruise of the Hornet, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 1822, at 2, World Newspaper
Archive, Doc. No. 12F7FEA751F7DE68.
37. See John Quincy Adams, Message from the President of the United States, Transmit-
ting, in Compliance with a Resolution of the Senate of 19th February Last, a Report from the
Secretary of the Navy Showing the Expense Annually Incurred in Carrying into Effect the Act
of March 2, 1819, for Prohibiting the Slave Trade, S. Doc. No. 20-3, at 10-1 (1827) (expendi-
ture form noting that Marshal John Nicholson paid $4,246.72 for the “clothing and mainte-
nance” of the captives).
38. See JONATHAN M. BRYANT, DARK PLACES OF THE EARTH: THE VOYAGE OF THE
SLAVE SHIP ANTELOPE 182-84 (2015).
39. Id. at xviii.
40. Id. (“[B]y affirming that while slaves might be human beings, at law slaves were
property, John Marshall’s Court shaped American jurisprudence on these issues for the next
thirty-five years.”).
41. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE 1 (1990).
42. Id.
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started long before the interception by the revenue cutter. Six months ear-
lier, a ship called the Columbia sailed from Baltimore under the Venezuelan
flag, but with a crew of primarily American citizens.43 Once at sea, the
sailors changed the name of the ship to the Arraganta, and headed toward
Africa.44 It then captured several vessels—one American, several Portu-
guese, and one Spanish (the Antelope)—and took African captives from
each.45 The crew of the Arraganta wrested control of the Antelope and the
two vessels sailed across the Atlantic to the coast of Brazil.46 When the
Arraganta wrecked off the coast, the crew and cargo were transferred to the
Antelope.47 The Antelope was on its way to the United States when the
revenue cutter captured the ship and brought the captives and crew to
Savannah, Georgia for trial.48
Thus, the eight-year litigation saga of the Antelope began, drawing in
several attorneys, all of whom formulated arguments devoid of captives’
stories. The Spanish and Portuguese (represented by Senator John Mac-
pherson Berrien, District Attorney Charles Ingersoll, and Congressman
Henry Wilde)49 argued that those captives taken from Spanish and Portu-
guese vessels were slaves and should be returned to their respective na-
tions.50 They argued that the United States had intercepted the Antelope
illegally, that international law required the United States to recognize
other countries’ laws and titles to property, and that any ethical argument
for freeing the captives was diminished by the country’s historical and con-
temporaneous slavery practices.51 The United States (represented by attor-
neys Richard Habersham and Francis Scott Key, and U.S. Attorney
General William Wirt) argued for the freedom of the captives under the
theory that the captives had been transported by American citizens in vio-
lation of the 1819 Slave Trade Act, that international law condemned the
slave trade, and that the captives were not property.52 A federal district
court ruled that the African slave trade continued under the laws of some
countries even if others prohibited it.53 The court found that the captives
should therefore be restored to Spain and Portugal, except for those taken
from the American vessel who were to be released from slavery.54 An ap-
43. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 68 (1825).
44. Id. at 67.
45. Id. at 67-68.
46. Id. at 123.
47. Id. at 68, 123.
48. Id. at 68.
49. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 95, 129.
50. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 68.
51. See NOONAN, supra note 41, at 99-102; see also BRYANT, supra note 38, at xix.
52. BRYANT, supra note 38, at 136-138; see also NOONAN, supra note 41, at 97-98.
53. BRYANT, supra note 38, at 141.
54. Id. at 141-42.
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peals court affirmed55 and directed the parties to use a lottery to determine
the fate of the captives because no records revealed which captives came
from which ship.56 Habersham appealed to the Supreme Court.57 Justice
John Marshall writing for the majority held that the slave trade did not
violate the law of nations and that the captives originally onboard the
Spanish ship should be returned to Spain.58 Because no Portuguese claim-
ant had materialized, the Court held that the Portuguese share would be
reduced to zero.59 However, the Court never formed a process for deter-
mining exactly which captive came from which boat and pushed the deci-
sion to the lower courts.60 There, the captives were arbitrarily divided
through a lottery-style system.61 Ninety-three captives were determined to
be Spanish property62 and of those, the thirty-seven individuals still surviv-
ing63 were later sold within the United States,64 solidifying the United
States’ participation in the illegal slave trade. The rest were determined to
be free,65 either because they were captured illegally from an American
ship66 or from the Portuguese ship, which still had no claimant.67 They
were transported to Africa,68 though by the end of the eight-year litigation
period more of the free captives had died than survived.69
Fifteen years later,70 a similar series of events, this time involving the
Amistad, led to a different outcome. In 1839, fifty-four Africans, who were
being illegally transported along the shore of Cuba on the ship Amistad,
managed to seize control of the vessel.71 They killed the captain and crew,
55. See id. at 149-51 (showing that in contrast to the district court ruling, Justice Johnson
increased the number of captives considered free and demanded that Portugal provide proof for
their claimant).
56. See NOONAN, supra note 41, at 65 (“[T]he lot must direct their fate; and the Al-
mighty will direct the hand that acts in the selections.”).
57. Id. at 74.
58. Id. at 112-13.
59. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 79-81 (1825); see also NOONAN, supra note 41, at 113-114.
60. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 116.
61. Id. at 119-32; BRYANT, supra note 38, at 249-56, 160.
62. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 116; but see id. at 122 (noting that the number was re-
duced to 50 to take into account those who had died since arrival).
63. See id. at 140 (noting that the number actually sold was 37, again due to death).
64. See id. at 139 (noting that a U.S. purchaser bought the Spanish property).
65. Id. at 123, 125.
66. BRYANT, supra note 38, at 149-50.
67. Id. at 237-39.
68. Id. at 261.
69. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 156; Cf. id. at 141 (220 captives were, given the court
ruling, free at the time of capture) with id. at 135 (approximately 120 of the captives on board the
ship heading to Africa were among those aboard the Antelope).
70. Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 518 (1841).
71. Id.
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except for two crewmembers who were ordered to navigate the ship to
Africa.72 The crew deceived the Africans and sailed instead toward the
United States, where the ship was intercepted.73 U.S. officials freed the
two crew members and imprisoned the Africans.74 A federal district court
judge ruled that the Africans were not liable for their actions because they
had been enslaved illegally.75 The case then proceeded on appeal to the
Supreme Court, where former president John Quincy Adams defended
the Africans and advocated for their freedom.76 The Court concluded that
because the international slave trade was illegal, the captives should be rec-
ognized as free under American law.77
Several theories may explain the different outcomes of the Antelope
and the Amistad, including a shift in societal attitudes toward slavery and
the slave trade in the years between the cases, different political climates,
and new legislation.78 The rest of Part I explores a different explanation
that is perhaps both reflective of and causally related to the others: the
treatment of the captives before and during the litigation of the trials.
C. Impact of Isolation on the Narratives of Slave Ship Captives
Although many voices contributed to the Antelope litigation,79 the
stories of the captives themselves are missing, despite seven years of litiga-
tion, are missing. A translator was hired several times80 and many of the
captives had learned English.81  Yet the documents contain no records of
anything said by a captive.82
Instead, the captives were presumptively treated as slaves before their
status was determined.83 They were “hard at work in homes and on plan-
tations in farthest Georgia. . .isolated and indistinguishable from the en-
slaved people working with them.”84 They had already suffered trauma
through violence, separation from family, and in some cases, sexual as-
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 519.
76. BRYANT, supra note 38, at 299.
77. Amistad, 40 U.S. at 519-21.
78. See e.g. BRYANT, supra 38 (“The Antelope predated the nationally coordinated and
vocal abolitionist organizations that would merge out of the growing conflict over slavery during
the 1820s and 1830s).
79. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 1-2, 95.
80. BRYANT, supra note 38, at xix.
81. Id. at 160.
82. Id. at xix- xx; but see id. at 159 (noting that a translator was used to translate directions
to the captives when they were working under Morel and other Georgia elite).
83. Id. at xx.
84. Id.; see also id. at 164 (“While the legal status of the captives remained uncertain,
working, living, and suffering like slaves on a Georgia plantation was their daily experience.”).
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sault.85 Many were children: 41 percent of the captives were between five
and ten years old, and at least eight were between two and five years old.86
They were handed to U.S. Marshal John H. Morel during the court pro-
ceedings and were then exploited by Morel and farmed out to the city of
Savannah and various other Savannah elite.87 Their work was unpaid, bru-
tal, and occurred during a health epidemic—in just the first six months,
one-fifth of the captives died.88
Morel—not the attorneys—would have the “greatest physical impact
upon [the captives’] lives.”89 He was found to be such a brutal slave
master that he was charged with murder, and the captives were temporarily
removed from his care.90 Morel had also found a way to game the system.
He had little use for the longevity of the captives’ lives in the same way
that he did for his own slaves because the captives would be taken from
him after the litigation.91 He therefore worked them while also charging
the government for their “care.”92 Each of the three slaves that personally
worked in his house died.93 By the end of litigation, 116 of the captives, or
approximately 46 percent had died.94  Not only did Morel and some of the
citizens of Savannah reap the benefits of the captives’ labor under cruel
conditions and a pretense of care,95 but Morel also became wealthy from
the affair.96
85. See id. at 164; see also id. at 102 (inferring that women and girls were sexually assaulted
by White sailors during the voyage).
86. BRYANT, supra note 38, at 73.
87. Id. at 165-66 (noting that captives not working for Morel and the city worked for
members of Savannah elite, allowing the elite to enjoy their lives on the backs of the captives’
free labor); see also id. at 196 (noting that Senator Berrien also held twenty captives as slaves,
despite his involvement advocating for Spain and Portugal).
88. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 46; see also BRYANT, supra note 38, at 163, 167-78 (noting
that Morel forced the captives to perform grueling labor and that all the captives suffered vio-
lence at the hands of their masters).
89. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 45.
90. Id. at 78-79.
91. BRYANT, supra note 38, at 185.
92. Id. at 185; see also NOONAN, supra note 41, at 79 (noting that that Secretary of War
and President were told by the Postmaster of Savannah that “the Marshal. . .was now accumulat-
ing a fortune of at least thirty thousand a year by working a number of Africans who are in his
possession as Marshal of the District. . .and that he intends to swamp the negroes – that is to
work them to death – before they shall be finally adjudicated out of his possession.”).
93. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 123.
94. Id. at 122.
95. See id. at 46 (noting that fifty captives—“The primest of the gang”—were sent to
work for an overseer for the City of Savannah, a few were rented out to householders in Savan-
nah, and 100 worked on Morel’s plantation).
96. See Sec. of Navy, S. Doc. No. 20-3, at 10 (1st Sess. 1827) (Morel paid $20,286.98
between 1820 and 1822); NOONAN, supra note 41 at 45-46; BRYANT, supra note 38, at 283
(noting that the captives must have made Morel at least $50,000, well over a million dollars
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In comparison, in the case of the Amistad the captives were not held
in isolation, indistinguishable from slaves. They were jailed in New Haven,
where abolitionists, journalists, and the general public flocked to visit the
jail.97 The jail itself was sparse and dirty, but the captives were able to use
their spare time to craft their case, build alliances with anti-slavery groups,
and study reading, writing, and religion.98 Perhaps most importantly, the
captives were in frequent contact with those outside the jail.99 The jail
became a meetinghouse for advocates, abolitionists, and the captives’
counsel.100
The next sections argue that the isolation and resulting treatment of
captives before status determination impacted both representation and
public perception in the cases of the Antelope and the Amistad, which in
turn led to their different outcomes.101 In the Antelope, isolation and en-
slavement led to ineffective representation, for it impacted counsels’ ability
to persuasively construct and incorporate captives’ stories to bolster their
arguments.102 On the other hand, in the Amistad, frequent interaction be-
tween advocates and the captives allowed counsel to develop a persuasive
account, bolstered with strong evidence, for the court.103 Isolation shaped
a public perception of the Antelope captives as an undifferentiated mass,
which in turn led to fewer champions to the captives’ cause and the even-
tual acceptance of a decision to arbitrarily divide the slaves by lottery.104 In
comparison, frequent interaction with the American public helped the
Amistad captives build alliances with abolitionists, understand the cultural
workings of American society, and create a coherent narrative that was
persuasive to the public and the court.105
1. Effects on Representation: The Antelope
The attorneys advocating for the captives’ freedom (Key, Wirt, and
Habersham) could have benefitted from interacting with captives given
their own background and biases. Key was from the American Coloniza-
today); David S. Reynolds, Worse than Dred Scott, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ( Aug. 7, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/worse-than-dred-scott-1438979854.
97. HOWARD JONES, MUTINY ON THE AMISTAD 65 (1987) (noting that in just a few days
after being transferred to the jail, visitors to the jail totaled approximately four thousand).
98. See MARCUS REDIKER, THE AMISTAD REBELLION: AN ATLANTIC ODYSSEY OF
FREEDOM AND REBELLION 8 (2012).
99. Id. at 110.
100. Id.
101. See infra Part I.C.
102. See infra Part I.C.i.
103. See infra Part I.C.ii.
104. See infra Part I.C.iii.
105. See infra Part I.C.iv.
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tion Society106 and both Key and Wirt owned slaves.107 Wirt had also
upheld the states’ tradition of selling illegally imported slaves in market108
and had stated that he was troubled by the emancipation and deportation
plan proposed by the Colonization Society because it would cause domes-
tic danger and “excitement among the slaves.”109 Habersham fought on
behalf of the captives and it is perhaps due to his work that the legal battle
was protracted.110 But even he owned slaves both pre- and post-trial.111
Although opposition to the slave trade and opposition to slavery were sep-
arate threads of political affiliation during the Antelope time period, the
attorneys’ relationship with general slavery practices undoubtedly colored
the attorneys’ perception of the captives and perhaps prevented them from
formulating the best arguments possible.
In fact, no documented effort was made by counsel to understand
and utilize the captives’ stories.112 Eliciting captives’ accounts would have
shed a light on the conditions of the ship, the conditions of the plantation,
and the captives’ geographical journey. It would have helped counsel de-
velop a narrative that would resonate with the public and the justices.113
Attorney Habersham asserted that the “United States was a mere nominal
claimant” and that the “negroes are the actual party.”114 Yet, Habersham
made no requests for an interpreter so that the captives could participate in
their fate by sharing their stories and, importantly, identifying the ships
they had sailed on.115 None of the captives ever appeared in court116 and
their attorneys never consulted them for direction.117 The first time any
106. See NOONAN, supra note 41, at 15; see also BRYANT, supra note 38, at 97 (noting that
the goal of the American Colonization Society was not abolitionism, but to establish an Ameri-
can colony in Africa where the United States could transport “problematic” free Blacks).
107. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 22.
108. Id. at 17.
109. Id. at 24.
110. Cf. id. at 40 (“Habersham framed the case for the freedom for the Africans which, for
the next seven years, was to occupy the courts of the United States.”), with BRYANT, supra note
38, at 97 (inferring that although Habersham fought fiercely for the freedom of the captives, he
was likely motivated by a duty to law and enforcing the slave trade acts, rather than the individual
lives of the captives).
111. BRYANT, supra note 38, at 96, 282.
112. See generally BRYANT, supra note 38, at xix; NOONAN, supra note 41, at 138.
113. See generally NOONAN, supra note 41, at 72-74. Justice Story was outwardly sympa-
thetic to the inhumane conditions on slave trade ships and could likely have been influenced by
first-hand accounts from captives. His disdain for the slave trade is what motivated him to “con-
vert[ ] ugly facts and moral outrage into a legal holding” for the case of Jeune Eugenie, and to
later rule favorably for the captives in the Amistad. Id.
114. Id. at 55.
115. Id.; see generally BRYANT, supra note 38, at 136 (detailing Habersham’s arguments,
which are devoid of the captives’ personal stories).
116. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 55.
117. Id. at 138.
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names were mentioned was a year and a half after the start of proceedings,
and the names were used only for lottery purposes to determine which
captives, arbitrarily, would be considered free.118 Officials only inquired
into the status and health of the captives in order to charge the government
for their care.119 Instead of relying on the captives’ accounts, Habersham’s
legal conclusions were drawn from testimony of the Americans on the
revenue cutter and of the crew of the Columbia (the initial ship that set out
from Baltimore).120
The legal arguments used by the captives’ counsel fell short because
there was no face or voice to give substance to the claim that the captives
were not property and should not be arbitrarily divided through a lottery.
The Antelope opinions discuss international law and general theories of
slavery, but lack captives’ anecdotes or discussion of their personal stake in
the outcome of the trial and the lottery.121 In the first Antelope case before
the Supreme Court, Key argued that neither Spain nor Portugal had iden-
tified which captives came from their respective ships, that a lottery disre-
garded the captives’ statuses as individual human beings, and that the
lottery was therefore an inadequate substitute for proof of identification.122
However, there is no evidence that counsel used the captives’ stories to
substantiate their individuality or that counsel even asked the captives to
identify which boat initially carried them.123  The lower court “did not
have before it the persons whose lives it was touching”124 and approved the
lottery, seemingly referring to the captives as “things which could be di-
vided as things in bulk are divided.”125 Habersham appealed once more to
the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Spanish proof was inadequate
and that all the captives, including the thirty-nine designated to Spain,
were free.126 Key again argued on behalf of the captives and stated “there is
no credible and competent evidence to identify them.”127 But again, Key
produced no evidence to emphasize that the captives were individuals and
not interchangeable.128 Because the captives’ counsel had done little to
show that the claimants’ arbitrary identification was misleading, there was a
low bar for the Spanish claimants to prove that the thirty-nine captives
118. Id. at 66.
119. See id. at 49-50, 122-23.
120. See id. at 55.
121. See The Antelope, 25 U.S. 546, 552 (1827); see generally The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66
(1825).
122. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 98-99.
123. See id. at 93-117.
124. Id. at 116.
125. Id. at 116-17.
126. Id. at 128.
127. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 129.
128. See generally id. at 93-117.
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came from the Spanish ship.129 The Supreme Court majority sided with
the Spanish claimants, writing that “under the peculiar and special circum-
stances of the case, the evidence of identity is competent, credible, and
reasonably satisfactory, to identify the whole thirty nine.”130
2. Effects on Representation: The Amistad
In contrast to the sparse number of attorneys willing to fight for the
Antelope captives, a slew of attorneys raced to support the cause of the
Amistad captives.131 Lawyers such as John Quincy Adams and Roger Bald-
win were motivated to defend the lives of the captives by the injustice of
the situation, rather than a legal obligation.132 Attorney Baldwin would
question the very imprisonment of the Africans in his arguments (“This is
a strange process – imprison them, in order to ascertain they are free!”),133
an inquiry never pursued by Antelope captives’ counsel despite the captives’
seven-year enslavement.
Access to the captives allowed advocates to seek and gather crucial
evidence to build their case. For example, a political activist named
Dwight Janes boarded the ship when it arrived and gathered facts such as
ship officers’ fabricated papers and the names of the captives and crew.134
He also conducted interviews with the captives on board to learn their
stories, much of which would be useful testimony in future trials.135
Interaction with the captives also allowed advocates to understand the
preparation necessary for a successful trial. For example, one advocate
noted that the language barrier would hinder the captives’ success in litiga-
tion.136 He and other anti-slavery activists and lawyers searched extensively
for translators to foster communication and dialogue between the captives
and their allies.137 The translators served more than just an interpretive
role—they also allowed the captives to develop their truth through another
129. See id. at 55, 127-28; see also id. at 125-26 (noting that the only proof of identification
offered by the Spanish was testimony from two individuals that the Spanish ship’s second mate
recognized some of the captives working on the plantations and that when he clapped his hands
and called out a foreign word, some of the captives approached him. No testimony confirmed
that those whom the second mate recognized were those identified as Spanish property).
130. The Antelope, 25 U.S. 546, 552 (1827).
131. See JONES, supra note 97, at 66.
132. See id. at 155-57. However, it is important to note that Adams was virtually silent
throughout the case of the Antelope, despite his position of power. See generally NOONAN, supra
note 41.
133. JONES, supra note 97, at 70.
134. REDIKER, supra note 98, at 104.
135. See id. at 104.
136. See id. at 118-19.
137. See id. at 119.
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lens, “building into [their] narrative[s], human connection and
humor.”138
Counsel also ensured captives and witnesses testified at trial (a situa-
tion barred by law at the time of the Antelope139), which allowed the cap-
tives to detail their stories to the court.  In the district court, Fuli, a male
captive, and Margru, a nine-year-old female captive, described their fami-
lies and their heart-wrenching captures.140 Cinque´, the leader of the mu-
tiny, had conversed so frequently with translators, the public, and counsel
that he was able to testify in English.141 Counsel also secured the testimony
of a well-known British abolitionist, Dr. Richard Madden, which proved
influential:142 Dr. Madden testified that by spending considerable time
with the captives, he could definitively say that the captives had come di-
rectly from Africa rather than Cuba.143
Unlike counsel for the Antelope captives, counsel for the Amistad cap-
tives visited and communicated with the captives and used those interac-
tions to bolster their legal arguments.144 For example, attorney Baldwin
wove the stories of the captives into his arguments when asserting that the
captives were free persons and not property.145 The Supreme Court re-
flected these arguments in its opinion by emphasizing the individuality of
the captives, naming the captives throughout its opinion146 and incorpo-
rating their individual stories and testimony into its decision.147
3. Effects on Public Perception: The Antelope
During the late 1700s and early 1800s, public perception of Africans,
even among abolitionists, was callous. The public knew little of the horrors
of the Antelope voyage or the humanity of the captives. In fact, adjudicators
and political leaders before and during the litigation process consistently
referred to the Antelope captives as “slaves” even before their slave status
was determined.148  The few newspapers that covered the case did not
138. Id. at 119, 125.
139. Alfred Avins, The Right to Be a Witness and the Fourteenth Amendment, 31 MO. L. REV.
471, 473 (1966) (“However, the rule was well established in the slave states, and in several of the
free states, that no Negro or mulatto could testify in cases in which white persons were parties.
Variations of this rule existed from state to state. In most states, the rule was a statutory one. . .”).
140. See REDIKER, supra note 98, at 13-15.
141. See JONES, supra note 97, at 123.
142. See id. at 106-09.
143. Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 533 (1841).
144. See JONES, supra note 97, at 154-58.
145. Id. at 70, 103.
146. See generally Amistad, 40 U.S. 518.
147. See, e.g., id. at 538, 558, 591.
148. See BRYANT, supra note 38, at 104 (noting that the Mayor requested the labor of the
captives in the same manner as requesting slave labor), 127 (noting that Justice Davies of the
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interview or provide personal accounts of the captives.149 The press instead
chose to comment “on the quality of the arguments and the power of their
presentation.”150 No cadre of abolitionists rose to advocate for the cap-
tives.151 Rather, most of Savannah society “looked at the Antelope captives,
black Africans, and saw slaves.”152
The view of the captives as a giant mass of “slaves” also perpetuated
the fear that their release would bring havoc and danger to society.153 Even
their advocates were wary of turning captives into free men.154 Contem-
porary political leaders echoed this sentiment.155 President Jefferson, dur-
ing the domestic and international slave trade debate, analogized free
Blacks to societal “pests”156 and feared freeing illegally imported Blacks.157
Attorney General Wirt questioned: “Should they have been turned loose
as free men by the State? The impolicy of such a course is too palpable to
find an advocate in anyone who is acquainted with the condition of slave-
holding states.”158 Wirt would ironically later tap into this fear in his first
and “least controversial” set of arguments before the Supreme Court on
behalf of the United States and the captives.159  He argued that the captives
should be freed and returned to Africa because “our national safety re-
quires that there be no increase in this species of population within our
territory.”160 The American Colonization Society too, was built on a de-
sire to both free Blacks and ensure that freed slaves were transported back
to Africa, rather than mixing into American society.161
If the captives were seen and described as an undifferentiated mass by
the public and counsel,162 it is not surprising that adjudicators across the
district court assumed that the captives were slaves before hearing the case and making a
judgment).
149. See id. at xx.
150. Id. at 228.
151. See id. at xx.
152. Id. at 136.
153. See id. at xv (citing Jefferson’s writing “we have a wolf by the ear, and we can neither
hold him, nor safely let him go”).
154. See generally BRYANT, supra note 38.
155. See infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
156. See Paul Finkelman, The Monster of Monticello, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/opinion/the-real-thomas-jefferson.html (“Jefferson told his
neighbor Edward Coles not to emancipate his own slaves, because free blacks were “pests in
society” who were “as incapable as children of taking care of themselves.”).
157. See BRYANT, supra note 38, at xv.
158. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 17.
159. Id. at 96.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 16-17, 20.
162. Senator Berrien’s arguments echo this perception of the indistinguishable nature of
the captives working alongside slaves in southern plantations and homes. See id. at 101 (describ-
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federal court system viewed the captives as divisible property and consist-
ently upheld a determination of freedom or slavery through an arbitrary
lottery system.163 It is not surprising that the captives, even when deter-
mined to be free, were arbitrarily torn from each other and the relation-
ships and families they had developed.164 And, it is not surprising that even
after some of the captives were determined to be free, they were still held
in slavery for an additional two years before the lottery took place.165
4. Effects on Public Perception: The Amistad
The Amistad captives escaped the undifferentiated mass mold that
plagued the Antelope captives.166 As historian Jonathan Bryant writes,
The slave trade tried to create a faceless, anonymous mass of
laborers for the plantations, but the Amistad Africans can be
known as individuals—who they were, where they were from,
what nations and ethnic groups they were part of, what sorts of
work they had done, what kinds of families they had lived on,
how old and tall they were, and finally, how they were
enslaved.167
In comparison to the Antelope captives, the Amistad captives had the
benefit of time and close physical proximity to the public.168 The aboli-
tionist movement burgeoned during the decade and a half after the Ante-
lope.169 The captives’ city-centered location helped galvanize support for
the Amistad cause because it allowed captives to interact frequently with
counsel, journalists, artists, and the general public.170 Through these inter-
actions, the captives were seen and depicted as individuals with agency.171
Frequent meetings and interviews enabled the captives to understand the
cultural norms of American society and develop their story to fit those
norms.172 Even when the captives’ case faltered and was appealed, the cap-
ing the captives as “an undivided mass which must be distributed in shares by some convenient
method”).
163. See supra Part I.B.
164. See BRYANT, supra note 38, at 196 (noting that when dividing up captives to relocate
them for work, the captives “had no choice in the matter and were split up with no regard for
relationships or familial ties”); see also id. at 263 (“Some reportedly did not want to go. . .[i]t
didn’t matter; wives, husbands, and children would have to be left behind.”).
165. Id. at 239.
166. REDIKER, supra note 98, at 21.
167. Id.
168. See Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 518 (1841).
169. See BRYANT, supra note 38, at xx.
170. See generally REDIKER, supra note 98, at 100-60.
171. Id. at 21.
172. See generally id.
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tives leveraged the revolving door of the jail to remain present in the public
eye and to strengthen their ties with abolitionists.173
Stirred by the story of the Amistad and the meetings of the captives
and American reformers, newspapers jumped to cover the story in detail.
Coverage was by turns sympathetic, inflammatory, harsh, insightful, sensa-
tionalized, and thought-provoking.174 Most importantly, it depicted the
captives as individuals, training the public eye to view them as humans,
rather than as an undifferentiated mass.175 At worst, the captives were re-
bellious and dangerous individuals upsetting the natural order.176 At best,
they were heroic individuals—political prisoners actively fighting for the
freedom that had been unjustly stolen from them.177
Artists, too, played a key role in representing the captives as powerful
individuals and drawing public sentiment and activism to their cause. Art-
ists drew and distributed lifelike sketches of the captives,178 and a wax figu-
rine artist replicated twenty-nine life-size figures, organized in the scene of
the mutiny.179 Another artist painted a 135-foot panorama of the captives
seizing their liberty on the ship as they overtook the captain and crew.180
Three days after the Amistad captives arrived in the New Haven jail, a
theater company began a series of performances titled “The Black
Schooner,” which reenacted a sensationalized version of the mutiny, sym-
pathetic to the captives’ plight.181
Communicating with advocates, counsel, interpreters, journalists,
and the general public also allowed the captives to develop their narratives
and couch them in the language, customs, and culture of American soci-
ety.182 For example, the captives learned how to emphasize aspects of their
stories that aligned with Christian ideals and to deemphasize aspects that
did not, such as polygamy.183 A coherent, compelling story of the rebel-
173. See JONES, supra note 97, at 79; see also REDIKER, supra note 98, at 153.
174. The New York Sun, for example, sensationalized the stories to meet reader appetite, the
Emancipator ruminated on anti-slavery theories, the Charleston Courier tracked the outcomes of
the mutiny leader, Cinque´, in great detail, The New Morning Herald offered an outsider, and often
racist, analysis, and the Richmond Enquirer and Southern Patriot severely condemned the actions of
the prisoners. See generally REDIKER, supra note 98.
175. See generally id.
176. See id. at 128, 141.
177. See id. at 103-04.
178. See id. at 100 (illustrating how the captives were depicted, and how the sketches were
titled with words such as “leader” and “brave.”); see id. at 113 (noting that one artist’s sketches
were known for their “variety, intimacy, depth, and complexity”).
179. JONES, supra note 97, at 149.
180. See REDIKER, supra note 98, at 116.
181. Id. at 114.
182. See, e.g., id. at 158-59.
183. See id.
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lion emerged, “in an interaction that featured abolitionist questions and
captive answers.”184
The combination of effective counsel, strong evidence, positive pub-
lic engagement, and persuasive narratives bore heavily on the Supreme
Court justices, in a manner absent in the Antelope litigation. Justice Story
adopted compelling stories that the captives repeatedly gave throughout
litigation: “[t]hey were natives of Africa, and were born free, and ever
since had been, and still of right were and ought to be, free and not
slaves. . .[t]hey were, in the land of their nativity, unlawfully kid-
napped. . .for the unlawful purpose of being sold as slaves, and were there
illegally landed for that purpose.”185 Justice Story had also served as a jus-
tice for the Antelope litigation, though the Antelope Court did not integrate
such stories into its opinion.186 For how could the Court have adopted
such stories?  The stories were never sought or told.
II. ASYLUM SEEKERS
In present day, the U.S. government suppresses the voices of another
group of people whose status has yet to be determined: asylum seekers.
Like the isolation of the Antelope captives, the isolation of asylum seekers in
detention centers far removed from counsel and the public causes a silenc-
ing effect that leads to or aggravates ineffective representation and harmful
public perception, which in turn harms the outcomes of cases and hear-
ings. Modern-day detained asylum seekers live 200 years apart from the
Antelope captives but are similarly prevented from developing narratives
that will resonate with judges and the public.
A. Many Asylum Roads Lead to Detention Centers
Asylum seekers are individuals who flee to the United States seeking
to prove that they are refugees as defined by the United States as part of its
commitment to human rights.187 To attain refugee status, asylum seekers
must prove that they are unable to return to and avail themselves of the
protection of their home country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.188  Regard-
less of the asylum application process that asylum seekers use, detention
184. Id. at 127.
185. Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1841); see also REDIKER, supra note 98, at 190.
186. See generally The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
187. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 295, 305 (2007).
188. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000).
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centers remain a common holding point for many during the process.189
Asylum seekers who are placed in detention can be divided into:
1) Those who present themselves at the border without valid
documentation190
2) Those apprehended at the border without valid
documentation191
3) Those who have entered the United States legally but have
overstayed their visas and are later apprehended192
4) Those who have entered the United States without inspec-
tion and are apprehended at a later date while in the
United States193
5) Those who are in the United States and have filed an asy-
lum application within one year of their last legal entry194
6) Those who seek asylum on their own initiative by filing an
application with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) (e.g. individuals who maintain valid nonimmigrant
visas, individuals who overstayed their visa, or individuals
who entered the United States without being formally
processed by immigration officials)195
Individuals in groups one and two are typically placed into an expe-
dited removal process upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry.196 These indi-
viduals immediately enter a defensive, adversarial process197 in which they
must first claim an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution.198
189. See Gwynne Skinner, Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in
the United States, 16 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 270, 271-77, fn. 15 (2008) (noting
that many asylum seekers are held in detention but that those who have been given the official
designation by the U.S. prior to entering the country are not subjected to detention and are
instead allowed into the U.S via official resettlement programs).
190. Id. at 274-78.
191. See id. at 274.
192. See id. at 275.
193. See id.
194. INA § 208(a)(2)(B).
195. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 305.
196. See Skinner, supra note 189, at 275; see also Notice Designating Aliens Subject to
Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67
Fed. Reg. 68,924 (Nov. 13, 2002) (delineating the procedures for expedited removal and deten-
tion of inadmissible aliens).
197. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3.
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2000); see also Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states.
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They are held in detention during this process.199 An immigration officer
then holds a hearing to determine if the asylum seeker has a credible fear
of persecution.200 If the officer determines that the asylum seeker does not
have a credible fear, he or she is immediately removed from the United
States without further hearing or review.201 If the officer determines that
the individual does have a credible fear, the individual is detained for fur-
ther consideration202 and awaits a hearing before an immigration judge.203
During the time the credible fear determination is pending, which could
take months, individuals are ineligible for bond.204 Those who do not pass
this initial test can appeal their asylum determination and are subjected to
detention throughout the process, which could last several years.205 Al-
though these individuals are eligible for parole, it is difficult to meet the
parole standards.206
Individuals in groups three and four are apprehended by the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), placed in detention, and
must also go through the defensive process.207 Although they have an op-
portunity to post bond (unless they are convicted of certain crimes), the
amount of money required by the bond is often so high that it “effectively
result[s] in ongoing detention.”208
Those in groups five and six (affirmative asylum applicants) are rarely
detained by ICE and may live outside detention centers while their appli-
cations are pending.209 They undergo a non-adversarial interview with an
asylum officer.210 If the asylum officer does not grant them asylum, the
asylum officer may refer the case to an immigration judge.211 While their
199. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii) (2017).
200. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (2009); see also Skinner, supra note 189, at 275.
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009).
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2009).
203. Skinner, supra note 189, at 275; see also Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra
note 198.
204. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (“Pending the credible fear determination by an asylum
officer and any review of that determination by an immigration judge, the alien shall be de-
tained. Parole of such alien in accordance with section 212(d)(5) of the Act may be permitted
only when the Attorney General determines, in the exercise of discretion, that parole is required
to meet a medical emergency or is necessary for a legitimate law enforcement objective.”); see
also Skinner, supra note 189, at 274.
205. See Skinner, supra note 189, at 275-76.
206. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (“Parole of such alien in accordance with section 212(d)(5)
of the Act may be permitted only when the Attorney General determines, in the exercise of
discretion, that parole is required to meet a medical emergency or is necessary for a legitimate
law enforcement objective.”); see also Skinner, supra note 189, at 275.
207. Skinner, supra note 189, at 276-77.
208. Id.
209. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 198.
210. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 306.
211. See id.
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application is pending, the asylum seeker may remain in the United
States.212 However, they too may be placed in detention if they are consid-
ered a flight risk.213
B. Conditions of Detention Facilities
Although detention for asylum seekers is decidedly different than
early 1800s slavery, the plight of some asylum seekers begins to become
comparable to the plight of the Antelope captives due to the United States’
increasing use of detention centers for asylum seekers, the length of deten-
tion, and the conditions of the centers.
Use of detention for asylum seekers sharply increased in the past dec-
ade,214 due in part to an increase in asylum seekers interested in coming to
the United States,215 Congress’s demand that ICE fill nearly 34,000 deten-
tion beds,216 and an expanded use of mandatory detention for anyone en-
tering the country without proper paperwork.217 ICE detained 44,270
asylum seekers in 2014, an approximate threefold increase from the 15,769
asylum seekers detained in 2010.218
Detention length is significant though difficult to track.219 An analy-
sis of the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse in 2015 found that,
as of December 2015, 400,000 cases were pending in immigration courts,
leading to an average wait time of 659 days for a hearing.220 A 2003 study
found that asylum seekers who were eventually granted refugee status had
spent an average of ten months in detention with the longest being de-
tained for three and one-half years.221  A 2009 Migration Policy Institute
report found that the average length of detention for those in formal re-
212. Obtaining Asylum, supra note 198.
213. See Jacob Oakes, U.S. Immigration Policy: Enforcement & Deportation Trump Fair Hear-
ings—Systematic Violations of International Non-Refoulement Obligations Regarding Refugees, 41 N.C.
J. Int’l. L. 833, 873 (2016).
214. Life on Lockdown, HUM. RTS. FIRST 11-12 (July 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/sites/default/files/Lifeline-on-Lockdown_0.pdf.
215. See Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Matter?: Judicial Responses to the Detention
of Asylum-Seekers in the United States and the United Kingdom, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 209,
211 (2015).
216. See Life on Lockdown, supra note 214, at 30.
217. See Meili, supra note 215, at 232.
218. Life on Lockdown, supra note 214, at 5.
219. See U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, DETAINED ASYLUM SEEKERS: FISCAL YEAR
2009 AND 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS (2012), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/
detained-asylum-seekers2009-2010.pdf (noting that “[t]he average length of stay statistics and
proportions in various outcome classes are not strictly comparable because elapsed time in a case
has a significant impact on the status of the case.”).
220. LINDA RABBEN, SANCTUARY AND ASYLUM: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY
200 (2016).
221. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BELLEVUE/NYU PROGRAM FOR SURVI-
VORS OF TORTURE, From Persecution to Prison: The Health Consequences of Detention for Asylum
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moval proceedings was approximately three months, while 13 percent had
been detained for three months or longer.222
Numerous studies highlight the deplorable conditions of many de-
tention facilities and some argue that the conditions fail to meet human
rights guarantees.223 Studies report on the lack of access to basic medical
care, the lack of privacy, use of solitary confinement, and separation from
family.224 An anthropology professor documented several stories of immi-
grant detainees’ detention center experiences, underscoring that 143 indi-
viduals have died in custody since 2003, and highlighting the punitive
nature of the centers:
Centers. . .are built and run according to the correctional
model, in defiance of the UN Refugee Convention. It could be
said that immigrant detainees are treated even worse than
criminals since many have not been charged with a crime, do
not understand why they are detained, and have no idea how
long they will be held or what will happen to them after deten-
tion ends. Frequent transfers far away from families or lawyers,
lack of medical attention or treatment for chronic or serious
conditions, isolation from fellow language speakers, and lack of
recreational or organized activities make detention a hellish ex-
perience, especially for traumatized survivors of torture, war, or
civil conflict.225
The stories also describe detainees being “abused physically and psycho-
logically by guards. . . and punished for calling attention to abuses.”226 A
more recent description of a family detention center in New Mexico de-
picts the center as filled with sick and malnourished children, often stuffed
eight to a room, with no activities to occupy their time.227
The next two sections focus on the grave effects of detention on two
factors that were similarly affected by the isolation of the Antelope captives
Seekers 15 (2003), https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/persecution-to-prison-US-2003
.pdf.
222. Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Li, Immigration Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal
Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 16 (2009) http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf.
223. See generally Michelle Brane´ & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Ad-
vancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 160-62 (2008).
224. Id.
225. RABBEN, supra note 220, at 199-00.
226. Id. at 202.
227. Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 4,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-
detention-camps.html?_r=0.
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two centuries ago: access to effective counsel and the ability to tap into and
influence public perception.
C. Isolation Prevents Asylum Seekers from Securing Effective Counsel to
Navigate Asylum Laws
Asylum seekers suffer many of the same hindrances as the Antelope
captives. Notably they are far removed—often hundreds of miles—from
counsel best able to help them develop persuasive stories and secure suc-
cessful case outcomes.228 The use of effective representation to successfully
wield evidence and filter stories to fit the worldview of the adjudicator is
particularly important when recognizing that cross-cultural and
psychosocial needs of asylum seekers, similar to the needs of the captives
on both the Antelope and the Amistad, can serve as barriers between the
narrative lived, the narrative communicated, and the narrative heard.229
1. Detained Asylum Seekers Lack Effective Counsel
Approximately a third of asylum seekers are unrepresented in immi-
gration court, according to a 2007 analysis.230 The use of detention centers
increases that percentage.231 A 2015 University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view article232 reveals marked inequality in representation by detention sta-
tus: from 2007 to 2012, only 14 percent of detained respondents were
represented,233 whereas 66 percent of non-detained respondents were rep-
resented.234  Of immigrant detainees who were represented, attorneys
were present in only 70 percent of hearings, and in 11 percent of cases,
attorneys did not attend any hearing.235 Moreover, detained immigrants
were less likely than non-detained immigrants to be granted additional
228. See generally Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 36-44 (2015); Cf. BRYANT, supra note 38, at xx (“The
Antelope captives, instead of sitting in jail only a day’s journey from New York [the location
where the Amistad captives were held], were hard at work in homes and plantations in farthest
Georgia.”).
229. See Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: Developing an Effective Model of
Holistic Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1001, 1034 (2015).
230. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 187, at 325.
231. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
232. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 228, at 32. The study is based on an independent analysis
of over 1.2 million immigration removal cases decided during the six-year period between 2007
and 2012. This dataset was obtained from the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR), the division of the Department of Justice that conducts immigration court proceedings.
233. See id. at 6. The authors note that these numbers may be inflated because “only 45%
of immigrants we count as ‘represented’ had an attorney appear at all of their court hearings.”
234. Id. at 8.
235. Id. at 20.
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time to find counsel236 and were less likely than non-detained respondents
to obtain counsel when given additional time to do so.237
Detained asylum seekers meet several barriers to securing and receiv-
ing high-quality representation. First, asylum seekers must pay for their
representation—a difficult requirement given the shortage of low-cost rep-
resentation and federal funding restrictions that limit the availability of le-
gal services for asylum seekers.238 Their stay in detention also prevents
them from earning money to pay for representation.239 Second, the loca-
tion and closed nature of detention centers creates a physical barrier to
representation.240 Legal representation and immigration services are scarce
in rural and remote areas, where many detention centers are located241 and
where almost one-third of detained cases are adjudicated.242 Only 2 per-
cent of immigrants facing removal proceedings receive counsel from large
law firms, law school clinics, or non-profits.243 Data shows that long dis-
tances may dissuade lawyers from spending time and money traveling to
meet their clients:244 immigrants with court hearings in cities with over
600,000 people had a 47 percent representation rate compared to the 11
percent of representation for immigrants with hearings in cities under
50,000.245 Third, counsel are deterred by other restraints such as long wait
times at detention centers, lengthy security clearances, and bans on laptops
and other electronics.246 Detention centers also lack consistent telephone
access, making it difficult for counsel to communicate with detainees and
thereby build a successful case.247
The unique needs of detainee immigrants multiply the impact of
these barriers on effective representation. Asylum cases require several
236. Id. at 33 (“[O]nly 14% of detained immigrants in our study were granted time to find
counsel, compared to 29% of nondetained immigrants”).
237. Id. at 34 (“Overall, only 36% of detained respondents seeking counsel actually found
counsel, versus 71% of respondents who were never detained and 65% of respondents who were
released.”).
238. See Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1015-16.
239. See id. at 1015; Eagly & Shafer, supra note 228, at 35.
240. “Like these detained immigrants, the captives in the Antelope were far removed and
closed off from the public.” See generally BRYANT, supra note 38.
241. See Detention Facilities Locator, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOM ENFORCEMENT http://
www.ice.gov/detention-facilities (last visited Nov. 26 2016); Eagly & Shafer supra note 228, at
36 (“Representation rates dip sharply in rural areas and small cities, where the supply of practic-
ing immigration attorneys is almost nonexistent.”); Cf. Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1015 n. 50
(noting that location is also partly due to restrictions on federal funding for legal services that
help asylum seekers).
242. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 228, at 43.
243. Id. at 8.
244. See id. at 35.
245. Id. at 40-41.
246. Id. at 35.
247. Id. at n. 131.
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types of professionals due to language barriers, mental health issues stem-
ming from experiencing trauma, and an ever-increasing burden of proof
required by adjudicators to corroborate testimony.248 The same barriers
that prevent lawyers from accessing detainees also prevent other profession-
als from reaching detainees, which in turn harms counsels’ ability to best
represent their clients.249
Like most asylum seekers, both the Antelope and Amistad captives
were detained. But, it is detention centers’ geographic locations—far re-
moved from the public—and their general inaccessibility to counsel and
the public that cause the plight of detained asylum seekers to more closely
parallel the plight of the Antelope captives (situated on a Georgia planta-
tion) rather than the plight of the Amistad captives (situated in a city-
center).250
2. Lack of Effective Counsel Leads to Poor Case Outcomes
For asylum seekers, lack of representation can mean removal from the
country—a possible death sentence for those with a credible claim.251 Data
shows that asylum seekers without representation were only one-fifth as
likely to win in immigration court compared to asylum seekers with repre-
sentation.252 In addition, representation can often mean more for detained
immigrants than non-detained immigrants. Detained immigrants with rep-
resentation were ten and one-half times more likely to succeed than their
pro se counterparts.253 Never-detained immigrants with representation
were three and one-half times more likely to succeed than their pro se
counterparts.254
Effective counsel is essential because the structure of asylum law re-
quires trained professionals to analyze multiple complex factors including
the substance of the law, the evidence required, the background of the
248. See Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1004, 1013 (“Collaboration among lawyers, psycho-
logical and medical professionals, and human rights experts is paramount to ensuring the high-
quality representation that asylum seekers need.”).
249. See id. See also Eagly, supra note 228, at 36-44. The same analysis concerning geo-
graphic barriers for lawyers would hold true for other professionals as well.
250. See generally BRYANT, supra note 38.
251. See generally Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 302; see also Fact Sheet: Asylum Reform
and Border Protection Act Would Return Persecuted Refugees to Danger, HUM. RITS. FIRST (July
2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-asylum-reform-and-border-
protection-act-would-return-persecuted-refugees-to-danger.pdf.
252. Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1003.
253. Eagly, supra note 228, at 49. This study shows correlation, but not necessarily causa-
tion. Id.
254. Id. at 49, 57 (noting that at every stage in immigration court proceedings, across every
nationality, “representation was associated with dramatically more successful case outcomes for
immigrant respondents. . .the significance of immigration representation persisted when we ex-
amined all removal cases together, as well as when we looked at detained and non-detained cases
separately”).
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client, the legal process, and the attitudes of adjudicators.255 Navigating
such complexities is difficult, even for experienced lawyers.256 Asylum
seekers must prove that their experiences with actual or threatened perse-
cution are true and would be eligible for asylum under U.S. law.257 Asy-
lum representation requires highly technical legal arguments revolving
around knowledge of the relevant statutes, awareness of changing country
conditions, and an understanding of how case law deciphers vague terms
such as “social group” and “credible fear.”258 For example, in one case, a
female asylum seeker testified persuasively during a preliminary hearing,
describing her husband’s murder and threats of sexual assault against her
from gangs.259  Judges have interpreted “social group” to include vic-
timhood on the basis of sex or sexual orientation.260 However, when the
judge asked the woman whether she felt targeted as a member of a “social
group,” the woman said “no.”261 The woman’s claim was denied and she
was deported.262 “[Social group] is a legal term of art. . .[s]he had no idea
what the heck it means,” an immigration lawyer later explained.263
Knowledge about what evidence will be most persuasive is also im-
portant, particularly because asylum seekers often do not know—and have
little way of knowing—which aspects of their experiences are most rele-
vant.264 For example, a client of the Harvard Immigration Clinic did not
realize that his brother’s murder was a key piece of evidence substantiating
his fear of return to his home country.265 Another client of the clinic
shared that she had been detained and beaten for her work with an opposi-
tion political party, but failed to recognize that her experience with female
genital mutilation was key evidence given that it is a recognized basis for
asylum.266 The asylum seeker must also gather enough evidence to meet
his burden of proof—a burden that is difficult to prove because “[m]any
asylum seekers often flee their home country with little other than the
clothes on their backs.”267 A lawyer is more likely to have the capacity and
255. See Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1002-03 n.53.
256. See id. at 1016 n.53.
257. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 305.
258. See id. at 311 (noting that the issues surrounding asylum law shift frequently: in re-
gional asylum offices, asylum officers undergo an intensive five-week training course with test-
ing, as well as weekly four-hour trainings on “new legal issues, country conditions, procedures,
and other relevant matters”).
259. Hylton, supra note 227.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1012-14.
265. Id. at 1019-20.
266. Id. at 1020.
267. Id. at 1013.
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knowledge to pinpoint and present the evidence that will be important for
the claim.268 This reality mirrors the case of the Amistad in which advo-
cates were able to gather relevant facts, such as fabricated ship papers, be-
cause they knew what judges would look for when making their
decision.269
Navigating asylum law also requires knowledge of legal processes (in-
cluding familiarity with the court systems and the appeals process), the
ability to complete cumbersome and complex legal tasks such as compiling
supporting affidavits, and the wherewithal to adapt to abrupt changes in
hearing dates.270 In fact, the actual process in immigration court changes
depending on whether the asylum seeker is represented.271 For unrepre-
sented asylum seekers, the immigration judge takes on the task of building
the factual record and questioning the asylum seeker.272 In order to fulfill
that role, immigration judges must mine the asylum seeker’s history and
experiences for relevant information.273  This information can be difficult
to gather due to the trauma inflicted on the asylum seeker, language barri-
ers, lack of access to important documents, and the fact that the informa-
tion is sensitive given the dangers associated with their home countries.274
In contrast, represented asylum seekers receive a more traditional court
hearing.275 Supporting witnesses testify and attorneys on both sides con-
duct direct- and cross-examinations, as well as opening and closing argu-
ments.276 Hearings for asylum seekers turn on strength of evidence, given
that the law requires solid evidence to prove applicants’ claims277 and that
the immigration court remains the last and often only place to present
evidence in support of their case before deportation.278 Unlike the unrep-
resented asylum seeker, the represented asylum seeker has an advocate who
can form a persuasive narrative and leverage testimony and other strong
evidence to corroborate their account.279
268. Id. at 1034.
269. See REDIKER, supra note 98, at 104.
270. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 384; see also Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1017
(noting that “immigration courts often schedule hearings with little warning” and that “courts
sometimes send hearing notices to prior addresses and asylum seekers might not even realize that
they have missed their court dates”).
271. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 325.
272. Id.
273. Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1017.
274. Id.
275. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 325.
276. Id.
277. See Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1014, 1022.
278. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 326.
279. See Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1034 (“Attorneys elicit the applicant’s testimony—the
lynchpin of the case—and gather corroborating evidence where possible and reasonably availa-
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Effective counsel ensures that asylum seekers craft narratives that not
only have legal merit, but that are coherent and align with particular
judges’ preferences.280 Asylum decisions involve a subjective judgment
about whether the applicant’s story is true.281 Two individuals may be
equally eligible for asylum, yet face different outcomes simply based on the
type of and manner in which evidence is presented.282 Narrative truths do
not always “guarantee a believable and credible story.”283 The power and
persuasiveness of a story requires asylum applicants to untangle their
“stream-of-consciousness reactions” and complex experiences and counsel
to “take this story. . . and fit[ ] it into the necessary form required for an
asylum application.”284 The type of evidence gathered and the way it is
developed into a narrative produce different outcomes for asylum seekers,
just as they drove the different outcomes of the Antelope and Amistad cases.
Moreover, immigration law contains particularly high variance in case out-
comes depending on court, region, and judge.285 This variance could be
due to differing political biases, implicit biases,286 gender biases,287 and
previous work experiences288—factors a keen attorney could take into ac-
count when counseling asylum seekers.
D. Isolation Prevents Asylum Seekers from Dispelling Harmful Public
Stereotypes and Developing a Successful Narrative
When asylum seekers are isolated in detention centers, they are to
the public much like the “undivided mass” that attorney Berrien uses to
describe the Antelope captives, who were isolated and enslaved in planta-
tions far removed from the broader public.289 This isolation inflicts harm
that is broader and perhaps more long-lasting than the harm done to their
ble. The attorney then works with the asylum seeker to create a timeline to sort through the
claim and presents the claim in a compelling manner persuasive to a Western adjudicator.”).
280. See id. at 1034; see also Jessica Mayo, supra note 1, at 1497 (“[J]udges are not immune
from the power of narrative, in which [n]arrative coherence and fidelity, not truth, is what
makes a story believable. Success of an asylum claim may therefore turn less on merit than on
storytelling skills.”).
281. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 306; see also Mayo, supra note 1, at 1497.
282. See Ardalan, supra note 229, at 1034.
283. Mayo, supra note 1, at 1496.
284. Id.
285. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 301-02 (arguing in the abstract section that the
variance in asylum law can be exceedingly stark: “. . .a situation in which one judge is 1820%
more likely to grant an application for important relief than another judge in the same court-
house. . .where one U.S. Court of Appeals is 1148% more likely to rule in favor of a petitioner
than another U.S. Court of Appeals. . .Welcome to the world of asylum law.”).
286. See Fatma Marouf, Implicit Biases and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417,
431 (2011).
287. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 187, at 346-48, 376-77.
288. See id. at 345-46.
289. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 101.
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ability to secure effective counsel. It perpetuates enduring stereotypes of
asylum seekers, decreases the ability of asylum seekers to create and use
national advocates, and hinders detainees in developing narratives that are
persuasive to voters, advocates, legislators, and judges.
1. Isolation Perpetuates Stereotypes
The depiction of refugees as an undivided mass or “tide” is harmful
to public perception,290 just as the depiction of free Blacks as dangerous
and as “pests” was harmful to public perception in the Antelope era.291
Conversely, the depiction of refugees as individuals is helpful.292 A 1993
public opinion poll found that Americans “are much more willing to wel-
come immigrants when the issue is couched in personal terms.”293 Simi-
larly, the illustration of refugees flooding the United States en masse is
harmful in comparison to an illustration of refugees living within individ-
ual communities.294 A 1957 Harris poll that asked whether respondents
“favored or opposed 130,000 Vietnamese refugees coming into the United
States” found 49 percent opposed and 27 percent in favor in contrast to 40
percent opposed and 48 percent in favor of the question that asked,
“Would you, yourself like to see some of these people come to live in this
community or not?”295 On a cultural level, an article analyzing the popular
film Casablanca argues that the film’s sympathetic and personalized depic-
tion of refugees positively influenced the growth of America’s interna-
tional refugee protection post-World War II.296 The article states that “the
refugees in Casablanca are clearly the ‘good guys,’ better even than the
more conflicted nominal hero, Rick Blaine. . .they appear in a favorable
light: they are likeable, nice people; they are generally well educated, well
spoken, and well dressed. . .[t]hey do not exist as an undifferentiated mass,
but appear as individual human beings, an effect which certainly enhances
their appeal.”297
The dangers of broad-based stereotypes are further illustrated in post-
9/11 policy shifts and in the 2016 presidential election. Following the Sep-
tember 11th terrorist attacks, the United States tightened its borders and
issued orders to remove asylum seekers and to assert more stringent mea-
290. Seth Mydans, Poll Finds Tide of Immigration Brings Hostility, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1993.
291. Finkelman, supra note 147; NOONAN, supra note 41, at xv.
292. See infra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
293. Seth Mydans, supra note 290.
294. RITA J SIMON & SUSAN H. ALEXANDER, THE AMBIVALENT WELCOME: PRINT ME-
DIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND IMMIGRATION 38 (1993).
295. Id. at 38-39.
296. See generally Daniel J. Steinbock, Refuge and Resistance: Casablanca’s Lessons for Refugee
Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649 (1993).
297. Id. at 678.
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sures during immigration hearings.298 The attacks gave political leaders a
way to tap into the fear of the public for political gain: “terrorism fears
gave conservative politicians like John Ashcroft an opportunity to decimate
asylum adjudication, harming many victims of persecution who have been
unable to press meritorious claims for refugee status and other forms of
relief.”299 The same holds true for the political response to Syrian asylum
seekers during the 2016 election season. Donald Trump stated that Syrian
refugees are part of a “Trojan Horse” plot,300 while Donald Trump Jr.
compared Syrian refugees to a bowl of poison-laced skittles with the mes-
sage “If I had a bowl of skittles and I told you that just three would kill
you, would you take a handful? That’s our Syrian Refugee Problem.”301
These types of dehumanizing analogies perpetuate a harmful stereotype
that asylum seekers are dangerous and illegal, and they obstruct the under-
standing that U.S. law welcomes asylees into the country, provided that
they go through the designated legal process. Isolation aggravates these ste-
reotypes. As an immigration paralegal described, residents on the other
side of the detention wall in Artesia, New Mexico “don’t understand the
law. They think [refugees] should be deported because they’re ‘illegals.’
So they’re missing a very big part of the story, which is that they aren’t
breaking the law. They’re trying to go through the process that’s laid out
in our laws.”302
Isolation from the public also makes more believable the alternate
stereotype that immigrants are helpless victims. When journalists visit de-
tention centers, most share the harrowing experiences of those held there
and emphasize the powerlessness of immigrants in the face of a ruthless
immigration system.303 While these stories are well-meaning, the isolation
298. James P. Eyster, Searching for the Key in the Wrong Place: Why “Common Sense” Credibil-
ity Rules Consistently Harm Refugees, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 42-44 (2012).
299. Peter Margulies, The Ivory Tower at Ground Zero: Conflict and Convergence in Legal Edu-
cation’s Responses to Terrorism, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373, 375 (2011).
300. Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Questions Whether Syrian Refugees Are a ‘Trojan
Horse,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/11/
16/trump-questions-whether-syrian-refugees-are-trojan-horse/.
301. Christine Hauser, Donald Trump Jr. Compares Syrian Refugees to Skittles that ‘Would Kill
You,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/us/politics/donald-
trump-jr-faces-backlash-after-comparing-syrian-refugees-to-skittles-that-can-kill.html. Donald
Trump Jr. also added the caption “This image says it all. Let’s end the politically correct agenda
that doesn’t put America first.” Id.
302. Hylton, supra note 227.
303. See Loren Siegel, Immigration and Gender: Analysis of Media Coverage and Public Opinion,
THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA (Dec. 2012), http://toolkit.opportunityagenda.org/documents/
immigration-and-gender:-analysis-of-media-coverage-and-public-opinion_1378929028.pdf  (an
analysis of mainstream media, based on the content of articles in 20 national, regional, and local
print outlets, that exposes a disconnect between how immigrant women are portrayed in the
media, and how they themselves define their lives, priorities, and aspirations).
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of the centers often causes journalists to neglect covering the agency of the
immigrants they profile:
In this narrative, instead of exercising stewardship, she is power-
less to prevent her family’s dissolution, even though she strug-
gles mightily to keep her family together. In her life outside of
the family, she is almost always depicted as the victim of ex-
ploitation at the hands of employers, traffickers, or violent part-
ners. The immigrant woman’s role as the family steward and
civic leader is missing from this dominant media narrative.304
This depiction of helplessness reinforces stereotypes of otherness and de-
pendency, which in turn reinforces the popular belief that immigrants are
a burden on the country.305 This message can unwittingly perpetuate anti-
immigrant feelings and suppress meaningful policy reform, given that
“[i]t’s very hard to pivot from victim to valuable members of society.”306
In the Antelope era, groups such as the American Colonization Society
similarly used victim-based language to argue against slavery.307 However,
they simultaneously argued that the aggression of free Blacks would neces-
sitate removal from the United States.308 Both messages—immigrants as
burdensome and Blacks as aggressive—perpetuate stereotypes that are in-
consistent with many Americans’ ideal version of society.
It becomes difficult for immigrants to escape from these harmful ste-
reotypes. For example, if women are categorized as submissive, voiceless
victims, then a woman who flees persecution due to her political activism
may face the additional hurdle of persuading the judge she has a credible
fear.309 Alternatively, if children are portrayed as defenseless victims with
little agency, then an entrepreneurial child who has organized her own
flight may have difficulty fitting into the “child” category.310
2. Isolation Prevents Asylum Seekers From
Developing Persuasive Narratives
Developing a narrative is crucial to receiving asylum, as discussed
earlier in this Note and in the cases of the Antelope and Amistad. In addi-
tion, a successful narrative is shaped not just by effective counsel, but also
through interactions with the broader public. Asylum seekers must know
304. Id. at 10.
305. Id. at 24.
306. Id. at 24, 44.
307. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 16-20.
308. Id.
309. Jacqueline Bhabha, Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy
and Human Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 155, 162-63 (2002).
310. Id. at 163.
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which features of their journey to highlight and which to omit.311 They
must be able to sift through their tangled webs of experiences and translate
them into a comprehensible and coherent record.312 The degree of consis-
tency, structure, and fidelity of a narrative has considerable influence on
adjudicators,313 because they must judge the trustworthiness or credibility
of another human being.314 Emotional impressions of a person and gut
feelings can have a substantial impact, and the ability to develop a certain
demeanor that resonates with decision-makers can be vital.315 Eliminating
inconsistencies is also important. Although studies indicate that “inconsis-
tency does not always indicate fabrication” and that “human beings are
generally not capable of repeatedly reporting events with perfect consis-
tency,” adjudicators are still instructed to take inconsistencies into account
when making their asylum determination.316
Detention severely hinders the ability of a detainee to develop and
deliver a persuasive narrative. The only way to craft and communicate a
story convincingly and credibly is to tell it and refine it—with counsel,
outside advocates, and other same-language speakers.317 Throughout the
process of listening and asking questions, “the attorney distills the truth
from the client’s version of his or her story into an acceptable format for
the legal system. This requires the construction of narrative truth. . .a nar-
rative constructed through the joint efforts of both client and attorney, an
amalgamation of both voices and points of view.”318 This benefit is also
achieved by honing anecdotes with advocates and peers, in the same way
that the Amistad captives were able to leverage the public and advocates to
form their winning narratives.319 For example, speaking with journalists
and advocates is helpful in practicing an anecdote, ironing out inconsisten-
cies, reordering events into a digestible timeline, dispelling nervousness,
adjusting body language, and tapping into the public perceptions that reso-
nate with judges. The asylum seeker is left in the end with a reconstructed
narrative, true to the individual’s lived experiences while also coherent to
immigration judges or officers who are far removed from them.320
311. See generally Mayo, supra note 1.
312. See id. at 1496.
313. See id. at 1497.
314. See id.
315. See Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in
Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 408 (2003).
316. Id. at 387-88.
317. See Mayo, supra note 1, at 1501-02.
318. Id. at 1501.
319. See supra Part I.
320. See Mayo, supra note 1, at 1501.
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CONCLUSION
The lessons from the Antelope and the Amistad are instructive for im-
migration policymakers and advocates today. The eventual Antelope deci-
sions were driven by the presumption of status and the isolation of the
captives in conditions equivalent to slavery. For how could lawyers, the
public, and adjudicators judge the captives fairly when they had already
isolated and enslaved the captives for years?  For the Amistad, success rested
in large measure on the ability of captives to interact with counsel, advo-
cates, and the public. Through this interaction, they were able to alter
public perception about Africans, cultivate advocates, and tell a coherent
story that resonated with their many listeners. The fate of those on the
Antelope and Amistad can seem distant and inconsequential in our present
lives—a troubling result of the prejudices of the time, outdated national
security demands, and an archaic belief that humans could be property.
However, nearly 200 years later, our current environment bears many sim-
ilarities—xenophobia and national security demands still command public
perception and rationalize isolated detention of those with a legal right to
be in the United States. The facts look different, but the patterns of isola-
tion and its outsized effect on representation and public perception remain
the same. The comparison of the effects of isolating the Antelope captives
on slave plantations before their status determination mirrors the effects of
isolating asylum seekers in detention centers before their status determina-
tion. Perhaps these parallels are not surprising if it is indeed true that
“[t]hose who think in terms of power, of abstract national interests, of
human beings in bulk, will always have a major role in governments.”321
However, historians have concluded that the case of the Antelope was
wrongly decided and that the treatment of the captives was cruel and inhu-
mane.322 If we could do it over, we would.323 Perhaps we can prevent its
distant descendant. The parallels of our current treatment of asylum seek-
ers with our past treatment of the Antelope captives should prompt legisla-
tors to change detention conditions or at least combat proposals that would
lengthen detention terms and further restrict federal funding for legal
counsel.324 The parallels should also influence judges interpreting federal
immigration law, such as when deciding whether aliens seeking U.S. ad-
321. NOONAN, supra note 41, at 159.
322. See id. at 156-59.
323. See NOONAN, supra note 41, at 155-157 (noting that John Quincy Adams, just twenty
years later, wished for a do-over and emphatically questioned in his Amistad arguments why three
hundred Africans were kept prisoners in the United States, instead of being liberated and imme-
diately returned Africa).
324. See Fact Sheet: Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act Would Return Persecuted Refugees
to Danger, HUM. RTS. FIRST (July 2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/
hrf-asylum-reform-and-border-protection-act-would-return-persecuted-refugees-to-danger.pdf
(stating the outcomes of the proposed Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act of 2017 (H.R.
391)).
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mission who are subject to lengthy mandatory detention must be afforded
bond hearings.325 Broadly, the parallels should convince the public that it
is irresponsible to chalk up the pervasive use of isolated detention to na-
tional security demands, without also recognizing and eliminating the ad-
ded harm and increased barriers that detention imposes on each individual
who steps through the asylum system.
325. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, SCOTUS BLOG (October 1, 2017), http://www.scotusblog
.com/case-files/cases/jennings-v-rodriguez/ (providing details on an upcoming Ninth Circuit
case).
